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EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY IN THE




Enron 401(k) Chief Defends Handling of Plan, Discloses He Sold
Stock in June
-The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2002.'
Scandal of unpaid workers-The One. Tel Meltdown
-The Australian, June 6, 2001.2
ARGE-scale corporate collapse is, sadly, a familiar problem in the
United States and Australia. The issues raised by such calamities,
in terms of corporate governance and accounting standards, are
being addressed by articles in the fall edition of this journal that deal with
* Barrister, Supreme Courts of New South Wales and Queensland; Lecturer in Law,
T.C. Beirne School of Law, The University of Queensland, Australia. The author wishes to
thank the many people who enriched her life and understanding of American law and
culture throughout her 2002 sabbatical to the United States, during which time this article
was written. First, the author thanks the Faculty of the Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law, who were gracious hosts. In particular, the author wishes to thank
Professor John Lowe, without whose organisational skills and generosity of time the trip
could not have occurred. The author is also grateful to Mr. Jon Schwartz as well as Profes-
sors Tom Mayo and Elizabeth Thornberg-who discussed issues of American culture, law,
and research. Outside of SMU, there were numerous staffers of the U.S. Government who
assisted in following the passage of the bills cited in this work through Congress. Further
lawyers; trade unionists; historians and account executives who were consulted on specific
issues have been acknowledged within the body of the article. This article was presented as
a paper to the SMU Faculty on October 8, 2002 and to the Dallas Bar Association on
November 19, 2002. The author is grateful to have had the opportunity to have made those
presentations and thanks those delegates who listened and provided constructive com-
ments. The author takes all responsibility for the flaws and faults of her work. All opin-
ions expressed are those of the author.
1. Kathy Chen, Enron 401(k) Chief Defends Handling of Plan, Discloses He Sold
Stock in June, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2002, at A5.
2. Duncan Macfarlane et al., Scandal of Unpaid Workers-The One. Tel Meltdown,
AUSTRALIAN, June 6, 2001, at 1.
SMU LAW REVIEW
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.3 This paper deals with the further,
equally important part of the tragedy of corporate insolvency-the losses
to workers of not just their jobs, but their unpaid wage and holiday enti-
tlements as well as their retirement savings.
This article is structured in three parts: Part I introduces the types of
labour systems that exist in the United States and Australia; Part II dis-
cusses the application of the law as analysed through case studies of the
"cause celebre"-America's Enron and Australia's One.Tel; and Part III
discusses the current law reform measures being debated and pursued.
It is to the latter debate that this article seeks to contribute. The basic
argument is that the United States should adopt strong regulations to
protect workers in the event of insolvency. Such regulations already exist
in Australia in acknowledgment that workers are often the blameless vic-
tims of insolvency and are the least able to absorb the types of losses
described above. Australia and the United States have traditionally
adopted different approaches to labour law. Australia is collectivist and
acknowledges a role for government intervention; the United States
favours individualism and freedom from regulation. However, through a
study of the Enron and One.Tel collapses, it is argued that the Australian
approach, although different from the American stance, offers options
that could be adapted for the United States. Such adaptations would pro-
tect U.S. workers, who are pursuing the mythical American dream,4 from
alleged white collar criminals, who are not. This article concludes by al-
luding to the fact that robust worker protections are not uniquely Austra-
lian, but either exist or are being adopted in Great Britain, the European
Union, and Canada. In short, strong regulation is not antithetical to the
American experience and would make American law more in keeping
with the international community.
I. NATIONAL APPROACHES
A. THE AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN SYSTEMS: A CONTRAST OF
INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM?
5
1. United States: Individualism and Freedom
a. The System
There are certain unionised "pockets" of the American labour force.
They participate in what is essentially a collective bargaining system in
3. For similar articles dealing with Australian reform, see John H. Farrar, Corporate
Group Insolvencies, Reform and the United States Experience, 8 INSOLVENcY L.J. 148
(2000); and Celia Hammond, Insolvent Companies and Employees: The Government's Year
2000 Solutions, 8 INSOLVENcY L.J. 86 (2000).
4. While the notion of the American dream surely means different things to different
people, it almost goes without saying that a part of the dream is realised through reward
for individual talent and effort.
5. The author accepts that no culture is monolithic, but merely notes that there is a
basic trend of individuality and collectivism in the American and Australian systems,
respectively.
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which the parties bargain with each other for collective agreements.
Within that framework is the National Labor Relations Board, which
considers alleged unfair labor practices and questions as to the rights of
trade union representation. There is a duty to bargain in good faith and
once a collective agreement is in place, it may provide for enforcement by
way of arbitration on matters arising out of the collective agreement.
However, the emphasis of U.S. industrial relations increasingly turns to
specialist employment law statutes, for example, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA)-which, as the name suggests, deals
with retirement benefits law.6 As will be noted throughout this article,
ERISA governs 401(k) plans, which place the responsibility for invest-
ment decisions on the individual employee.
The further interesting aspect of the American system is the notion of
"employment at will"-the idea that employment may be terminated at
the behest of the employer, not necessarily with lengthy notice or rea-
sons.7 In contrast, the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Termi-
nation of Employment Convention promotes legislation prescribing fair
notice and warnings.8
b. Rationale for the System
History
Hardin and Higgins, in The Developing Labor Law, undertake a
breathtaking analysis of American labour law.9 They note that organised
labour in the United States had a difficult development.' 0 Many early
court decisions limited union activities and many early strikes were vio-
lent.1' When protection and promotion of unionism did emerge in the
form of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act),' 2 it was due to
historical factors-the advent of the New Deal designed to overcome the
effects of the Great Depression.1 3 Collectivism was not something em-
braced at the start of the American nation. Likewise, curtailment of the
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1974).
7. There are exceptions to employment at will, such as academic tenure, but the con-
cept is an interesting feature of U.S. employment law.
8. See generally Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative
of the Employer, June 22, .1982, International Labour Organization Convention No. 158,
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C158 (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
This Convention has never been ratified by the United States. See International Labour
Organization, List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions: United States,
available at http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standardslnormes/appl/Appl-byCtry.cfm?
hdroff=1&CTYCHOICE=0610 (last visited Mar. 27, 2003). (The United States has ratified
fourteen ILO conventions, twelve of which have entered into force.)
9. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr. eds., 4th
ed. 2001).
10. 1 id. at 3-70.
11. See, e.g., I id. (discussing In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895)).
12. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1998). This
statute established the National Labor Relations Board and gave employees the right to
unionise.
13. See I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 9, at 24. Basically, economists
thought the low spending power of workers would prolong the effects of the Depression.
SMU LAW REVIEW
Wagner Act came only twelve years later with the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act. 14
In a similar vein, Loewenberg reflects on U.S. labour laws in these
terms:
Although the passage of the National Labor Relations Act was a
watershed in the labor relations policy of the United States and pro-
vided a legal basis for unions' organising and bargaining activity, the
basic idea of free collective bargaining remained unchanged. In the
all-important area of impasses, the economic strike was still regarded
as the appropriate method to determine superior bargaining power
and hence outcomes. The National Labor Relations Act, therefore,
did little to disturb the underlying notion that the parties in collective
bargaining were equal in power, independent of other areas of soci-
ety, and free to work out their own agreement within the framework
of the law.' 5
National Character
In the preface to his book, People of Paradox, Michael Kammen makes
the observation that:
For quite some time now, and particularly during the past twenty-
five years, many books about American culture and character have
been published. Some of them are extremely perceptive and inter-
esting; others naive or foolish; and most of them tend to confirm
Jacques Barzun's observation that "of all the books that no one can
write, those about nations and national character are the most
impossible." 16
In this Australian author's first foray into U.S. publishing, it is hardly
appropriate for her to preach to an American audience about their own
national character. May it simply be suggested that America is individu-
alistic and cherishes freedom.
This ideal has flowed from The Declaration of Independence on July 4,
1776, in which Thomas Jefferson referred to the British Government of
the day as a "Tyrant ... unfit to be the ruler of a free people,"', 7 to the
Gettysburg Address in 1863, where Abraham Lincoln referred to "a new
nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all
14. 1 id. at 19, 35 (discussing the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144 (1998)). The authors then go on to discuss the subsequent legislation,
such as the Landrum-Griffin Act (1958). The combined effect of these statutes was to limit
the right to strike, monitor trade union practices (not just employer practices), and allow
freedom to refrain from joining union actions (not simply freedom to join). These changes
have been attributed to alleged union abuse of the power they gained under the Wagner
Act, as well as through ideological pursuits.
15. J. Joseph Loewenberg, Compulsory Arbitration in the United States, in COMPUL-
SORY ARBITRATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 141-42 (J. Joseph Loewenberg ed.,
1976). There is some capacity for voluntary conciliation at impasse, but no wide recourse
to, for example, compulsory arbitration.
16. MICHAEL KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: AN INOUIRY CONCERNING THE ORI-
GINS OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION Xi (1972).
17. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
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men are created equal."' 8
Judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States, such as Lochner
v. New York, 19 are interesting in this context. Although that case no
longer stands as good law,20 the colourful language of the judgment ex-
emplifies the passion with which freedom of contract, as opposed to regu-
lation, has been embraced at various times in U.S. labor law. In finding
invalid a law which sought to regulate the hours of work in a bakery on
health grounds, the Court pronounced:
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part
of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution .... The right to purchase or sell
labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment ....
It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail-the
power of the State to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty
of person and freedom of contract ....
... the protection of the Federal Constitution from undue interfer-
ence with liberty of person and freedom of contract is visionary ....
[Without it, n]ot only the hours of employees, but the hours of em-
ployers, could be regulated, and doctors, lawyers, scientists, all profes-
sional men, as well as athletes and artisans, could be forbidden to
fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours of exercise, lest the
fighting strength of the State be impaired.2 1
As noted earlier, there are, indeed, now statutes such as ERISA that,
for example, offer some regulation of employees' retirement benefits.
But, even then, this author hastens to re-emphasise that the 401(k) plans
governed by that statute emphasise the employee's individual investment
decisions. Further, collective bargaining and employment at will leave
much responsibility for the terms of the employment relationship to the
parties themselves.
2. Australia: Collectivism and Egalitarianism
a. The System
For the first eighty years of the twentieth century, the Australian sys-
tem was based on the compulsory conciliation and arbitration of indus-
trial disputes. In other words, large representative bodies of unions and
employer organisations would represent their constituents before a cen-
tral third-party "umpire" of sorts-an industrial commission-which
would attempt to mediate disputes (conciliation) or arbitrate, if media-
tion proved unsuccessful. The result of arbitration was an award that
18. President Abraham Lincoln, Address at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettys-
burg (Nov. 19, 1863).
19. Lochner v. Nork York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
20. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
21. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53, 57-58 (emphasis added).
SMU LAW REVIEW
would set out the terms and conditions of employment to operate be-
tween the parties before the Commission. In the making of such award,
the Commission would take into account the national (economic) inter-
est-questions were asked, for example, as to what effect the award
would have on future employment opportunities.
While awards were meant to be specific to a particular dispute, over
time the Commission used its own decisions as precedents for other dis-
putes within an industry, resulting in the emergence of industry-wide
standards. There were "test cases," for example, the Termination, Change
and Redundancy (TCR) Case,22 which established certain entitlements to
redundancy pay (namely, up to eight weeks pay, depending on length of
service) in acknowledgement that the worker loses their job through no
fault of their own; and requires compensation for disruption to their
career.
Obviously, times have changed greatly since the start of last century-
instantaneous communication and the emergence of global competition
require businesses to respond quickly to problems and to compete with
the world's best practice. The consequent need for flexibility within busi-
ness is acknowledged in the main Australian legislation, the Workplace
Relations Act of 1996.23 This statute furthers decentralisation within
Australian labour law-a greater capacity now resting with employers to
strike enterprise-based agreements, which acknowledge particular busi-
ness concerns, and individual agreements.
However, despite the move towards decentralisation, basic social safety
nets-of the type outlined above-remain, and below them, no bargain
should be struck.24 Australia also has reasonable levels of compliance
with ILO conventions as demonstrated by Australia's unfair dismissal
laws.25
22. AUSTRALIAN CONCILIATION AN!) ARIBITRATION COMMISSION, TERMINATION,
CHANGE AND) REDUNDANCY CASE, Print F6230 (1984).
23. Workplace Relations Act, 1996 (Austl.).
24. See Louise W. Floyd, Workplace Relations: Employment Labour & Industrial Law,
in CLIVE TURNER, AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAl. LAW (24th ed. 2002). Obviously, the evolu-
tion of the Australian system, particularly decentralization, has been greatly simplified.
For further reading, see BREEN CREIGHTON & ANDREW STEWART, LABOUR LAW: AN IN-
TRODUCTION (3d ed. 2000). The strength of the safety nets has been considered by, for
example, Omar Merlo, Flexibility and Stretching Rights: The No Disadvantage Test in En-
terprise Bargaining, 13 AUSTRALIAN J. LAB. L. 207 (2000). The declining strength of Aus-
tralian trade unions and the role that plays on worker protection has been considered by
Louise W. Floyd, Weipa and the Wharves: Australian Strike Law and Its Effects on Trade
Union Power, 18 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 65 (1999), and M. Vranken, Labour Law Deregula-
tion and the Australian Workplace Relations Act 1996, in LA3OUR LAW AN1) INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS AT ''I TURN OF THE CENTURY 823 (Chris Engels ed., 1998). For specific
sections of the Workplace Relations Act of 1996 relevant to decentralisation and basic
safety nets, see, for example, sections 3, 88A, 170LT, and 170XA. See also AUSTRALIAN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, AcCOMMODATION, HOTELS, RESORIS, AN!) GAM-
ING AWARD, Decision 1533/97 M Print P7500 (1997), available at http://www.osiris.gov.au.
25. See Workplace Relations Act, 1996, pt. VIA, div. 3 (Austl.). See also International
Labour Organization, List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions: Australia,
available at http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-byCtry.cfm?cty
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b. Rationale for the System26
History
The system was created by the Conciliation and Arbitration Act of
1904.27 That legislation was enacted after trade unions had engaged in a
series of bloody and violent strikes across the country during the adverse
economic conditions of the late 1890s. Although those strikes failed, the
fracas and social dislocation they caused prompted even conservative vot-
ers to urge the government to adopt a system of peaceful industrial dis-
pute resolution. Without such a system, how could investment in the
fledgling Australian nation come to be? 28
The Australians were aware that such a system of compulsory arbitra-
tion had been rejected in the United States. 29 There, it was regarded as
"antithetical to democratic ideals and practices."'30 It was viewed as forc-
ing the will of the State on freely negotiating parties, hence undermining
collective bargaining, which the Americans believed worked effectively. 3'
The Australians were not anti-American, but to the Australians, the
American system had problems of its own. 32 Unfettered bargaining was
said to risk elevating the strength of the bargaining parties above the jus-
tice of the issue at the heart of the dispute. In the Second Reading of the
Bill to the Australian House of Representatives, then Attorney General,
Sir Alfred Deakin, proclaimed:
This Bill marks, in my opinion, the beginning of a new phase of civili-
zation. It begins the establishment of the People's Peace, under
which the conduct of industrial affairs... may be guided .... Hith-
erto, there has been but one method of dealing with strikes and lock-
outs, and one inevitable result. The strongest party has always
prevailed. The cause was not in question; the matter of dispute was
choice=0040 (last visited Mar. 27, 2003) (Australia has ratified fifty-seven ILO conventions,
forty-eight of which have entered into force.).
26. Materials in this subsection derive from Louise W. Floyd, Glass Houses and Rock
Solid Guarantees-Worker Protection in Australian Labour Law (unpublished work-in-
progress Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney) (on file with author). Such work was
presented to the year 2001 Legal Research Two and Three classes at the University of
Sydney Law School for critical review. The author thanks the students in those classes for
their feedback; the academics who took those classes-Professors Terry Carney and Hilary
Astor; and, of course, her Ph.D. supervisor, Professor Ron McCallum.
27. Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904 (Austl.).
28. The historical background to the adoption of the arbitration system has been well
documented. See THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARBITRATON: THE ORIGINS AND EFFECTS OF
STATE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 1890-1914 (S. McIntyre & R. Mitchell eds., 1989)
[hereinafter FOUNDATIONS OF ARBITRATION].
29. As noted by Loewenberg, compulsory arbitration has only been adopted in the
United States in limited circumstances, for example, as a special measure to deal with a
crisis such as war. Loewenberg, supra note 15, at 141-42.
30. Id. at xiii.
31. See supra notes 29-30.
32. In fact, in Parliamentary Debate before the Australian House of Representatives,
a number of members praised the American people and their enterprising nature. See, e.g.,
SIR ALFRED DEAKIN, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION AcT OF 1904, HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, 15 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 2868 (July
30, 1903).
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not weighed. Give to one side numbers and means now, and it wins.
The cause counts for nothing; power counts for everything; might
makes right. Under the new system-and here is the revolution-a
different aim will operate. Might is not to make right. But, as soon
as it can be discerned and determined, right is to make might. 33
The Australians acknowledged that in the United States it was some
unions, rather than some employers, who had become autocratic in the
pursuit of their ends. 34 Thus, Deakin noted that arbitration was to apply
equally to employers and unions to find peaceful and fair resolution of
conflict. 35 Deakin also reflected on the need to allow for the free opera-
tion of business and the development of Australian trade. Significantly,
though, he believed that such goals cannot be meaningfully attained
through the exploitation of others. In other words, the Australians saw
social justice and business efficacy as mutually supportive, not mutually
exclusive goals. To use Deakin's words, "[p]ermanent prosperity can only
be based upon institutions which are cemented by social justice. ' 36 The
arbitration commission was to operate free from dogma or dictation; its
judgments were to be confined to the facts and the merits of any given
case. It was not to be rigidly controlled by Parliament, nor was it to inter-
fere too much in the operations of business or the relationship between
the parties. It had as its only direction the requirement that "in the hear-
ing and determination of every industrial dispute the court shall act ac-
cording to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the
case.37
National Character
That such a system should be adopted in Australia owes much to the
character of its people. As Walker noted in his analysis of Australian
arbitration, the working men who built up Australian trade unions drew
on their often bitter experience in Britain. 38 Some of them had been for-
cibly deported for illegal combination. Others had taken part in radical
activities: Irish rebels, participants in the chartist revolt, and other dissi-
33. Id. at 2864.
34. REID, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION ACT OF 1904, HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES, 15 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 3186 (Aug. 6,
1903).
35. SIR ALFRED DEAKIN, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION ACT OF 1904, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 15 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 2870
(July 30, 1903).
36. Id. at 2868. The language has a strong human rights bent, noting that Australia
"did not desire" to become like Ancient Egypt, where the might of the pyramids was built
off the "abject misery ... of the masses." Id. There is a vision for the type of egalitarian
society that he wants Australia to become. However, the surrounding passages of the
speech do note an acknowledgment of the needs of business and enterprise, so it is submit-
ted the speech notes the mutual dependence of business and humanitarian prosperity-it is
not merely a motherhood statement.
37. Id. at 2870.
38. Kenneth F. Walker, Compulsory Arbitration in Australia, in COMPULSORY ARBI-
TRATION, supra note 15, at 2.
[Vol. 56
2003] EMPLOYEE ENTITLEMENTS AFTER INSOLVENCY 983
dents. "Trade union organisation was a natural growth among such a
population, many of whom were sympathetic to wider social reform. '3 9
Further, the people were pragmatic-and arbitration was a practical at-
tempt to gain peace. 40
While all these factors came to bear on the shaping of the Australian
system at the turn of the twentieth century, Australia's egalitarian spirit
came to imbue many aspects of the country's working life as well as the
kaleidoscope of fundamental institutions that formed its government.
The speeches emblematic of Australia's two political parties-both right
wing and left wing-went on to provide a looking glass for this approach.
A radio address by Sir Robert Menzies in 1942 outlined his views for
social policy. These views later became the foundation of conservative
Australian politics and a plea to nurture endeavours of the burgeoning
middle class. Yet, interestingly, they accepted a role for Government
intervention:
If the new world is to be a world of men we must be not pallid and
bloodless ghosts, but a community of people whose motto shall be,
"To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield." Individual enterprise
must drive us forward. That does not mean that we are to return to the
old and selfish notions of laissez faire. The functions of the State will
be much more than merely keeping the ring within which the competi-
tors will fight. Our social and industrial obligations will be increased.
There will be more law, not less; more control, not less. But what
really happens to us will depend on how many people we have who
are of the great and sober and dynamic middle-class-the strivers,
the planners, the ambitious ones. We shall destroy them at our
peril. 41
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the signature speech of the left- wing, union-
based, Australian Labour Party also championed the need for the State to
protect the weakest members of the community. On November 14, 1949,
Prime Minister J.B. Chifley gave his address, The Light on the Hill:
We affirm for every man the right to receive a fair return for his
labour, enterprise, and initiative. But we do say that it is the duty
and the responsibility of the community, and particularly those more
fortunately placed, to see that our less fortunate fellow citizens are
protected from those shafts of fate which leave them helpless and
without hope. That is the objective for which we are striving. It is
. ..the beacon, the light on the hill, to which our eyes are always
turned and to which our efforts are always directed.4 2
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3; see also FOUNDATIONS OF ARBITRATION, supra note 28.
41. Sir Robert Menzies (Radio broadcast, May 22, 1942), reprinted in THE FORGOIrEN
PEOPLE (Angus & Robertson 1943) (emphasis added).
42. Prime Minister J.B. Chifley, The Light on the Hill, Address at the Australian La-
bour Party Campaign Launch (Nov. 14, 1949). The author is indebted to Roslyn Russell,
who organised the 1999 "Going My Way" Exhibition in Old Parliament House, Canberra,
Australia, for her cooperation in the provision of this extract from Chifley's speech.
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II. CASE STUDIES
A. ENRON: UNITED STATES
1. The Problem of Enron
In the years 2000-2001, Enron's stock price rose as high as $90 per
share and it was ranked as the seventh largest company (based on reve-
nue) in "The Fortune 500."'43 Later, in 2001, Enron declared a loss of
$618 million 44 and restated its annual financial statements for the previ-
ous four years.45 Consequently, the stock price dropped to almost noth-
ing and the corporation collapsed by 2002.46 Enron's employees lost their
jobs and their retirement benefits, which had been invested heavily in
company stock.
Some of the various employee lawsuits that have arisen concerning En-
ron are detailed below. The main complaint arises in pension law. 47 It
alleges that the total amount of loss to the employee retirement savings
plan members was $1.3 billion (U.S. dollars), representing more than
62% of the total asset value of all investments in the Enron Savings Plan,
and that such loss stemmed from breaches of duty by Enron fiduciaries.48
According to the complaint, the story of the rise and fall of Enron
hinges on the alleged use of "special purpose entities" (SPEs) and
breaches of U.S. accounting standards by the company, its accountants,
and other advisors. 49 Simply put, the complaint alleges that Enron and its
board had extremely close links with its accountants and lawyers-all of
whom were being paid millions in fees by Enron. Together, they were
able to "hide" corporate losses in off-the-books SPEs to make the com-
pany appear more profitable than it was.50 The profits that were reported
to the Government and public were inflated, and the financial reports,
although certified as correct by the accountants/auditors, were in breach
of U.S. accounting standards. 51 While painting a "glowing picture" of
Enron's future, the directors, who knew of the inner workings of the com-
pany, were selling their own stock. 52 When the stock price finally crashed,
the directors had predominantly sold out of the company, yet they
changed the administrator of the Savings Plan, which caused a lockdown
and prevented the employees from selling their Enron stock.53
43. First Consolidated and Amended Complaint at para. 199, Tittle v. Enron Corp.(S.D. Tex. 2002) (No. H 01-3913) [hereinafter Tittle Complaint], available at http//enron
erisa.com/complaint.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
44. Id. para. 274.
45. Id. para. 15.
46. Id. para. 23.
47. See id.
48. Id. at paras. 10, 273.
49. Id. paras. 133-138, 149-156, 199-203.
50. Id.
51. Id. paras. 205-239.
52. Id. paras. 64-94, 137, 207, 240-273, 276.
53. Id. paras. 64, 137, 256, 276.
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2. Legal Action
Under section 507 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, employees take what
is owed to them (by way of unpaid wages and the like) only after secured
creditors have been paid and administrative expenses satisfied; 54 and
their entitlements are subject to a ceiling of $2,000. 55 However, Epstein
notes, "most employees will not [even] get $2,000" as, in the typical bank-
ruptcy, most of the limited funds available will have already been used on
meeting the (aforementioned) prioritised claims. 56 Although there are
reasons for this situation-the existence of security for certain debts and
the necessity of facilitating the administration of the bankrupt estate-
the employees of Enron were obliged to take action, themselves, to se-
cure some of the wage and retirement funds they had lost.57 These ac-
tions included bankruptcy proceedings and employee benefits claims. In
the bankruptcy proceedings, it was argued that severance pay was paya-
ble under a binding severance plan. It was alternatively argued that such
funds, along with wages and vacation pay, were an administrative ex-
pense of the bankruptcy and, therefore, entitled to preference. 58 In the
action regarding employee benefits claims, it was alleged that the admin-
istrators of the Enron 401(k) Savings Plan breached their fiduciary
duty.59
a. Bankruptcy Claim 60
The Bankruptcy Court appointed a committee to represent the inter-
ests of the former employees and, subsequently, the AFL-CIO was able
to intervene in the matter. The document at the centre of the dispute was
The Enron Severance Plan, which provided for severance pay calculated
as "one week of base pay for each full or partial year of employment plus
one week of base pay for each $10,000 (or portion thereof) of base pay,
less any severance previously paid to such employee, subject to a $30,000
cap per employee."' 6' An essential provision of the Severance Plan,
found in section 8.1, indicated that the plan "shall be terminated upon the
54. "Administrative expenses" are defined in 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1993) as "the
actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries or
commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case." See DAVIo G.
EPSTEIN ET AL., 2 BANKRUPTCY § 7-11 at 301-02 (t992).
55. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 54, § 7-12 at 304.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. This case has since been settled out of court.
59. At the time of writing, the action on the employee benefits claim was ongoing.
60. In re Enron Corp. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 01-16034). The author is grateful
to Mr. Lowell Peterson of Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., 1350 Broadway, Suite 501,
New York, New York 10018, for supplying a copy of the settlement documents in this case.
The author also wishes to thank Mr. Damon Silvers of the AFL-CIO for his generosity and
the time he spent discussing the basics of this case.
61. Joint Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for an Order Approv-
ing (A) Settlement of Severance Claims of Similarly Situated Claimants, (B) Procedures
for Opting Out of Settlement, (C) Form and Manner of Notices to Eligible Former Em-
ployees and (D) Assignment of Authority to Prosecute Certain Avoidance Actions para. 8,
In re Enron Corp. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 01-16034) [hereinafter Joint Motion].
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happening of ... Bankruptcy. 62
The primary issue in the case was whether the Severance Plan did auto-
matically terminate on the bankruptcy petition date. The former employ-
ees argued that the plan did not terminate on the company's insolvency
because the Summary Plan Description, which controlled the Severance
Plan, did not contain a reference to the automatic termination of the
plan.63 Enron and the creditor's committee concentrated on the actual
words of the plan itself.
A subsidiary issue also arose as to the nature of severance pay. In this
connection, the argument raised by the former employees was that re-
gardless of the termination date of the Severance Plan, the severance
payments were administrative expenses and, therefore, gained some pri-
ority pursuant to the decision in Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union
No. 3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.64 In this case, it
was decided that once the eligibility period is served, full severance pay is
due whenever termination of employment occurs. Severance pay is com-
pensation for termination-it does not accrue from day-to-day work.
Rather, it is an expense of the administration of the bankrupt estate
where the termination is an incident of that bankruptcy. The employees
argued that this decision made their claims administrative expenses.
65
Enron and the creditor's committee countered that Straus-Duparquet
was not applicable where claimants have provided no post-petition bene-
fit to the debtor's estates.66 Further, they argued that Straus-Duparquet
had been modified by subsequent Second Circuit decisions such that sev-
erance pay that represents payment for past services is not entitled to
administrative expense priority.67
62. Id. para. 33.
63. Id. para. 34. The settlement documents also contain numerous other arguments
raised by the former employees in this context: namely, that the automatic termination
provision of the Enron Severance Plan is an unlawful ipso facto clause prohibited under
the bankruptcy code; and that, in any event, Enron was required to follow the amendment
procedures in the Enron Severance Plan in order to terminate it.
64. Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 386 F.2d
649 (2d Cir. 1967).
65. It is interesting to note that the actual terms of the severance pay requirements in
Straus- Duparquet were as follows:
To those employees who have been in the employ of the company one (1)
year but under three (3) years, one (1) week's severance pay. To those over
three (3) years, two (2) weeks' severance pay, provided, however, they were
discharged through no fault of their own. Employees shall be paid at the
time of separation.
Id. at 650. On the topic of vacation pay, the court in Straus-Duparquet held that such was
recoverable as an administrative expense only to the extent of the proportionate part of
total vacation pay earned during the period from beginning of bankruptcy administration
to the date of the termination of employment. Vacation pay was not properly classified as
an expense of administration because it is earned from day-to-day over the period of a year
intervening between vacations. The rules on vacation pay were as follows: after twelve
months employment, two weeks vacation with pay; after 15 years or more, three weeks
with pay. Id.
66. See Joint Motion, supra note 61, para. 35.
67. Id.
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Under Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a) and (b), the Bankruptcy Court may
approve compromises and settlements if they are in the best interests of
the bankrupt estate and where they fix a class of controversies.68 In August
2002, the court did this by providing that employers make cash payments
to settling former employees in satisfaction of allowed administrative ex-
penses calculated by reference to the Enron Severance Plan (up to a max-
imum of $13,500).69 Basically, had the former employees succeeded in
this case, the company would have been required to pay an additional $68
million, while the estimated cost of the settlement was $28.8 million.
Given the nature of the case and the questions involved therein, there
was a strong probability that one party would appeal, no matter what
decision was rendered.
In consideration for this settlement, the employees waived their rights
to a universe of claims-except for those under ERISA.
b. Retirement Benefits Claim70
The first case filed on behalf of the participants in the Enron 401(k)
retirement plan is the class action, Tittle v. Enron Corp.71 This complaint
brings actions against, among others, the administrators of Enron's
401(k) plan for breach of fiduciary duty and other ERISA violations. 72
The central fiduciary duties found in ERISA are as follows:
"[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely
in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries and
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an en-
terprise of like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimise
the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so; and
68. FeD. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a), (b). In making the decision whether to sanction such
settlements, the court looks at a variety of factors such as (1) the balance between the
probability of success on the merits by either the defendant or the plaintiff, and the bene-
fits of the settlement to the estate; (2) the prospects of complex and protracted litigation
including any attendant expense, inconvenience and delay; and (3) the breadth of the
releases.
69. Interview by Tim Russert with John Sweeney, President, AFL-CIO, Meet the Press
(NBC television broadcast, Aug. 11, 2002).
70. Most of the facts and allegations derive from the Tittle Complaint. See Tittle
Complaint, supra note 43.
71. Tittle v. Enron Corp. (S.D. Tex. 2002) (No. H 01-3913).
72. Tittle Complaint, supra note 43. The complaint includes other claims such as those
brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 664
(2000). Id.
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(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent
with the provisions of this title .... 73
Essentially, the complaint alleges that the conduct outlined above trans-
gresses the fiduciary duties in a number of ways: 74
" The directors' reports, statements, and assurances, induced
thousands of employees to invest millions in Enron stock for the pur-
poses of the Enron 401(k). 75 The argument is that this supports the
claims that the plan was not run for the exclusive benefit of the
employees.76
" The directors' assurances also contributed to the fact that the em-
ployees did not diversify.77 The lack of diversification ran afoul of
the terms of the plan, which required diversification (although it is
conceded in the complaint that diversification rules do not necessa-
rily apply to plans of this type).78
* The plan administrators ordered a "lockdown" of the Enron 401(k)
plan knowing such action would prevent employees from moving
their Enron stock into more profitable investments.79
" There was a failure in monitoring the plan's fiduciaries and in dis-
closing to them material facts concerning Enron's condition.8 1°
As presented, the evidence alleged in the complaint would, at first blush,
appear compelling:
* At an employee meeting on September 26, 2001, Enron's chief exec-
utive officer, Kenneth Lay, was asked the direct question by an
employee:
Enron has been aggressive in the use of SPVs collateralizing future
cash flows for the sake of present earnings. I couldn't help but no-
tice our auditor, Arthur Andersen of Houston, recently admitted
guilt and paid the largest fine ever for criminal falsifications related
to SPVs on behalf of another large Houston corporation. You are a
man of integrity, so my "question" is a chance for you to reassure us
we have no such problems here at Enron.81* To this, Lay responded:
To begin with, I can assure you that I or the Board of Directors,
would not approve the use of any SPVs or other types of financial
vehicles unless we were convinced both by all of our internal officers
as well as our external auditor and counsel, that they were legal and
totally appropriate.8 2
73. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(A)-(D) (1999).
74. Tittle Complaint, supra note 43, paras. 736-783.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. paras. 255, 269, 272, 763.
78. Id. para. 696.
79. Id. para. 748.
80. Id. para. 778.
81. Id. para. 269.
82. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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" Answering another question concerning stock price, Lay is alleged to
have replied:
[T]here have been all kinds of reckless and unfounded rumors about
Enron and the financial condition of Enron. To the extent that our
employees begin repeating those rumors and spreading those
rumours to other employees as well as family members and friends
outside the company, it gives them a level of credibility that they do
not deserve. And, thus damages the stock price. The company is
fundamentally sound. The balance sheet is strong. Our financial li-
quidity has never been stronger. And we again have record operat-
ing and financial results. 8 3
* At the same time he was making these statements to the employees,
Lay was selling approximately $26 million of his own Enron stock.
* Likewise, before plan administrators ordered the lockdown of the
plan, which they knew would prevent employees from selling their
Enron stock, Lay and another plan administrator were warned by a
company vice president that she was "incredibly nervous that [Enron
would] implode in a wave of accounting scandals. ''84 This statement
was never disclosed by Lay to plan participants or the broader ad-
ministrative committee.
A problem facing the Enron employees was noted in the luminous
work of Susan Stabile in her article Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Con-
gress' Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own
Devices.85 Essentially, section 404(c) of ERISA limits fiduciary responsi-
bilities in cases where employees exercise control over their own
investments:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts
and permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the
assets in his account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control
over the assets in his account (as determined under regulations of the
Secretary [of Labor])[, then] (A) such participant or beneficiary shall
not be deemed to be a fiduciary by reason of such exercise, and (B)
no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part
for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such
participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.
86
Stabile has been valiant in her attempts to demonstrate the problems with
that section.87 Essentially, it was part of ERISA before 401(k) plans were
83. Id. (emphasis omitted).
84. Id. para. 686.
85. Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision to
Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 361,
365-66 (2002); see also Marisa Rogoway, Comment, Proposed Reforms to the Regulation of
401(k) Plans in the Wake of the Enron Disaster, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 423, 427
(2002).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(I)(A)-(B) (2002).
87. In fact, one might say that Professor Stabile has been valiant in her efforts to
demonstrate a number of problems with 401(k) plan regulations (from an employee per-
spective) for many years. She has been writing about the problem of possible over-invest-
SMU LAW REVIEW
invented. The fiduciary provisions were meant to protect against any de-
ficiencies of the managers of defined benefit funds. The assumption was
that employees would only act in their own interests and that their invest-
ment decisions were their own private concern. But, as Stabile points
out, few employees understand every investment document they read and
many employees may be influenced by the way their employer presents
their various investment options. In other words, does the employee re-
ally have control at all or, to speak colloquially, have they been given just
enough rope to hang themselves?8"
The Tittle Complaint questions whether the Enron employees had the
requisite degree of control and alleges that the Enron 401(k) plan did not
comply with the relevant Department of Labor regulation governing sec-
tion 404(c): 89
In order to qualify as a § 404(c) plan [under that regulation], a plan
must provide plan participants with a broad range of diversified in-
vestment options, liberal opportunities to transfer assets among allo-
cations, and sufficient information to make sound investment
decisions .... Equally important, such a plan must put participants
explicitly on notice that it intends to qualify under § 404(c). This is
... something the Enron 401(k) Plan has never done.
[This] means that at all times Enron and the Administrative Com-
mittee were and are liable for the results of all investment decisions
taken with respect to the Plan's assets, including decisions ostensibly
made, in whole or in part, by Plan participants themselves. 90
At the time of writing, an application to strike out the Tittle proceedings
was being considered. The Secretary of Labor was opposing such appli-
cation to strike (amicus curiae).
3. Conclusion
Under U.S. law, in the event of employer insolvency, employees must
protect their own entitlements. They will almost never receive back the
full amount they have lost. In bankruptcy, they may be forced into
lengthy legal disputes to gain entitlements like severance pay, which they
thought was a valid part of their employment contract. In terms of ER-
ISA, there is an obstacle to overcome in the form of section 404(c).
The following analysis of a similar problem in Australia demonstrates a
more employee-friendly, interventionist approach. It is used to support
an argument for reform of the American system.
ment in employer stock as early as 1998. See Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in
Employer Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61 (1998); discussion
infra notes 147-55.
88. Stabile, supra note 85, at 380-83.
89. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2003).
90. Tittle Complaint, supra note 43, paras. 670-671 (citations omitted). Stabile notes
that protection afforded by regulation 404(c) has been interpreted broadly. Stabile, supra
note 85, at 377-78 (discussing In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 72 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996)).
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B. ONE.TEL: AUSTRALIA
Although it went through its short life with the slogan "You tell your
friends about One.Tel," the One.Tel communications company collapsed
in such a spectacular fashion that those who had told their friends about
the company probably had few friends left. The collapse of One.Tel may
loosely be described as Australia's Enron. The importance of the com-
parison is to demonstrate how workers were treated differently and, in
the view of this author, more fairly, under Australian law than the former
Enron employees have been treated under American law. The reason for
this difference, it is submitted, is that the Australian system is more in-
terventionist. It recognises employees as victims of corporate collapse.
Most times, they have not contributed to the employer's insolvency, and
often they have been misled by those who did.
1. The Problem of One. Tel
Investigative journalist, Paul Barry, chronicled One.Tel's rise and fall in
his pithy and, at times, witty book, Rich Kids: How the Murdochs and
Packers Lost $950 Million in One. Tel.91 Basically, Barry explains how the
company grew from nothing in the late nineties, to a business that
"spanned seven countries, employed 3,000 staff and had annual sales
close to $1 billion" by 2001, only to crash that same year.92 It seemed,
notes Barry, that the company structure was more akin to a family busi-
ness and did not develop appropriate accounting systems and controls as
it grew. Its founders excelled at selling the vision of the business and
were brave enough to take risks, but did not suit the "tedious, daily
grind" of management. 93 One management consultant was quoted as
saying: "There weren't enough boring people in the company. There
weren't enough men in grey cardigans. '94 The beginning of the end for
One.Tel came when the Australian corporate watchdog, the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC),95 advised the company
to deduct $173 million worth of advertising and customer acquisition
costs it had previously deferred. Consequently, the company showed a
total loss of $291 million. Cash flow was a problem and the directors
indicated further losses would be declared in the next year.96
Unlike the scandal surrounding the Enron collapse, it has not been al-
leged that One.Tel directors deliberately misguided employees into in-
vesting in the company. 97 Yet, there is a striking similarity to Enron. A
major allegation is that the One.Tel directors concealed the true financial
91. PAUL BARRY, RICH KIDS: How THE MURDOCHS AND PACKERS LOST $950 MIL-
LION IN ONETEL (2002).
92. Id. at 185.
93. Id. at 187.
94. Id.
95. ASIC is akin to, for example, the SEC in the United States.
96. BARRY, supra note 91, at 208-09.
97. In any event, the Australian retirement benefits structures are different from those
of the United States. See infra Part II.B.1.b.
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state of the company and allowed the company to trade while insolvent. 9s
As Barry notes:
[N]one of [the loss] was highlighted in the glossy annual report that
One.Tel sent to its shareholders in September, which managed to
avoid using the word "loss" in the first 37 pages. There was nothing
about the $291 million loss in the chairman's letter or the personal
missive from Jodee [Rich]. Nor was there any mention of it in an
entire page of "Key Financial Information" about the company.
Strangely enough, the directors also felt it too trivial to talk about in
their review of operations. It was in the accounts, of course, as it had
to be [under Australian law]. And there was one solitary line ...
which reported blandly that: "The consolidated loss of the Consoli-
dated Entity after providing for income tax amounted to $291.1
million."
As always, the rest of the One.Tel story was about "success,"
"achievement," "growth," "the future," "exciting opportunities" and
a whole range of businesses that were going to become profitable
very, very soon.
The losses were not the only topic that One.Tel's annual report
glossed over. Deep in the financial statement, where companies
have a statutory duty to disclose what they have paid their directors,
was the extraordinary revelation that Brad [Keeling] and Jodee
[Rich] [the two directors] had helped themselves to bonuses of $6.9
million apiece-on top of annual salaries of $560,000-despite the
company's shocking performance.9 9
While One.Tel's directors, Brad Keeling and Jodee Rich, were making
$6.9 million in bonuses as the company went broke, One.Tel's workers,
who earned on average $28,000 per year, lost their jobs."' The question
of accessing unpaid wages and holiday pay was of obvious importance to
people of such limited means-they could hardly absorb the loss, which
they had not created. In the case of One.Tel, these outstanding entitle-
ments exceeded $17 million owed to 1,600 former employees.' 10
The following is a discussion of (1) how One.Tel's Australian employ-
ees gained outstanding pay and leave entitlements, and (2) how the ques-
tion of retirement benefits was resolved.
98. BARRY, supra note 91, at 326-27 (referring to complaints in the New South Wales
Supreme Court).
99. Id. at 210.
100. Press Release, Community & Public Sector Union, One.Tel Staff Deserve Protec-
tion (May 31, 2001), available at http://www.cpsu.org/media/aprjun_0l/One310501.htm
(last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
101. Press Release, Community & Public Sector Union, Paid in Full: Some Justice at
Last for One.Tel Workers (July 24, 2001) [hereinafter Paid in Full], available at http://www.
cpsu.org/media/jul-sept01/onetel240701.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
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a. Pay and Leave Entitlements
Employees as Preferred Creditors and Union Intervention in the
Insolvency Process
On the face of it, the position of employees of insolvent companies in
Australia begins in much the same vein as in the United States. Under
section 556 of the Corporations Act of 2001, employees take their entitle-
ments after payment of both the secured creditors and of the liquidator's
expenses, but before other unsecured creditors-even the Australian Tax-
ation Office. 1°2 This preference suffers the same flaw in Australia as it
does in the United States-namely, that there may be no assets left to
cover employee claims.' 0 3 In Australia, however, there is at least one
consolation; there is no ceiling on the amount of entitlements the em-
ployee may be awarded. Thus, in the event (albeit unlikely) that a liqui-
dator had sufficient assets to pay employees, then, technically, there
would be nothing barring those employees from being awarded the full
amount owed to them.
Aware of its weakness, the relevant Australian union, the Community
and Public Sector Union (CPSU), did exactly what the AFL-CIO did in
the United States; it sought to influence the insolvency process directly at
the stage of Voluntary Administration (the Australian equivalent of
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the United States). This is where differences in
the systems emerge. Those differences highlight Australia's intervention-
ist approach, involving arbitration awards, fair social safety nets, and
community standards.
Arbitration Awards, Fair Social Safety Nets and Community
Standards
As noted earlier in this article, the Australian system, although decen-
tralising, still contains an industrial award system that forms a safety net
of basic entitlements. These conditions may sometimes have broad appli-
cation across an industry. Further, they can sometimes form community
standards-that is, basic conditions considered by the Australian public
to be so much a part of Australian working life that they "go without
saying" if an employee is covered by an award. One such condition is
redundancy pay-payment provided to workers when their job is made
redundant through no fault of their own, providing a financial safety net
so that they can readjust. This was established in the TCR Case.10 4
102. Corporations Act, 2001, § 556 (Austl.). Robbie Campo notes that employees take
before a floating charge. Robbie Campo, The Protection of Employee Entitlements in the
Event of Employer Insolvency: Australian Initiatives in the Light of International Models, 13
AUSTRALIAN J. LAB. L. 236 (2000).
103. See Campo, supra note 102, at 244 (quoting A.S. Bronstein, The Protection of
Workers' Claims in the Event of the Insolvency of Their Employer: From Civil Law to So-
cial Security, 126 INT'L LAB. R. 715, 723 (1987)).
104. See supra note 22.
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In the One.Tel insolvency, most of the employees were not members of
the relevant union, the CPSU. Further, they were employed under indi-
vidual contracts of employment, which made no provision for redundancy
pay. There were no agreements and no pre-existing awards. So, on the
face of it, the One.Tel employees fell outside the safety nets mentioned
above.
Nevertheless, in CPSU v. One.Tel, Ltd.,10 5 the CPSU applied for an
interim award to cover the One.Tel workers, which was to include a pro-
vision for redundancy pay as a community standard. The award was
granted by the Commission. Although not all the employees were union
members, the union had been arguing for months about its eligibility
rules with a view towards making an award that would apply to the
One.Tel staff.
The Commission made its award in the public interest in these terms:
This is an application for the making of an award to cover employees
of One.Tel Limited, (administrator appointed). The proposed award
seeks to bind One.Tel Limited, the CPSU ... its members and those
eligible to be members and employees of One.Tel Limited (in admin-
istration). The award seeks to create safety net rights in relation to
annual leave, redundancy pay and notice and payment of termina-
tion of employment.
The award is sought because of the serious circumstances in which
both the company and employees find themselves. This is not a
happy situation but it is one which, in my view, attracts the public
interest and demands action by the Commission. The award seeks to
do no more than provide a safety net which the Commission is en-
joined to consider pursuant to section 88B(1) and (2) of the Work-
place Relations Act 1996.106
I am prepared to make this award. In making the award I will do
so on an interim basis and I am mindful of the need to balance the
rights and obligations of both the employer and its employees.
•.. I can do no more than wish the administrator well in his task so
that employment opportunities may exist with this company. In this
sense, a good outcome would be that the award that I now make will
have no useful purpose. 10 7
In the view of this author, the Commissioner's reference to balancing
"the rights and obligations of both the employers and its employees" and
well wishes to the administrator "so that employment opportunities may
exist with [the] company" demonstrates that this jurisdiction is not that of
105. CPSU v. One.Tel, Ltd. (2001) Australian Industrial Relations Commission PR
904915. The author is indebted to Mr. Andrew Rich, Lawyer, CPSU, for his time in ex-
plaining to her the background to the arguments raised at the One.Tel application. Being
an interim order, the reported judgment in One. Tel is necessarily brief.
106. Section 88 speaks of "the need to provide fair minimum standards for employees
in the context of living standards generally prevailing in the Australian community."
Workplace Relations Act, 1996, § 88B(2)(a) (Austl.).
107. One.Tel, PR 904915, para. 8.
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the "bleeding heart," but rather one that has struck a fair balance be-
tween business efficacy and fairness towards workers.' 0 8 It was an in-
terim award-the administrator always had the option to try resuscitating
the company-and was simply a safety net if the administrator chose to
wind up the company (the equivalent of Chapter Seven in the United
States). The award met the urgency of the situation-the creditors meet-
ing was the following day-the administrator needed to know the poten-
tial costs facing him, and the employees needed to know what their
potential entitlements might be.
Once the interim award was made, the administrator went to the credi-
tor's meeting. Lobbied by employees and the union, and knowing that
they were supported by the State and Federal Government, the adminis-
trator recommended to the creditor's meeting that the company be
wound up and the employees paid. The creditors agreed. 10 9
The difference between the Australian and American systems is stark.
The Enron workers did gain a voice at a creditor's meeting, but did so by
fighting to preserve terms that were already in a severance agreement
that applied specifically to them. In contrast, the One.Tel workers, who
had freely negotiated contracts of employment that did not contain re-
dundancy provisions, were able to gain redundancy entitlements because
they were said to represent Australian community standards and were
necessary to provide employees with a fair social safety net.
The result in One. Tel was gained by the intervention of trade unions
and the actions of the Commission in reliance on community standards.
But, it is not a guarantee that all employees in similar situations in the
future will be so fortunate. In One. Tel, particularly significant was that
both State and Federal Governments supported the workers, there were
mass rallies at the time of the Commission hearing and the creditor's
meeting, and there was a torrent of public sympathy for humble employ-
ees whose bosses' behaviour had been woeful. There can be no doubt
that these events contributed to the Commission's decision to intervene
in the public interest, and particularly to the Commission's decision at the
creditor's meeting to pay the employees.
General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme
(GEERS) 110
One. Tel was settled through the tandem operation of the Australian
industrial system and the voluntary administration process. At the start
of the discussion of how the One.Tel employees gained outstanding
wages, the weaknesses of the basic preference to employees in winding
up were alluded to."' Such deficiencies have spawned a debate about
108. Id.
109. Paid in Full, supra note 101.
110. See Campo, supra note 102, at 244.
111. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
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the role of public law in protecting employee entitlements. As noted by
Bronstein:
While, therefore, the adequacy of the protection of the service re-
lated claim depends partly on the extent of the preference accorded
to employees and partly on the ranking of this preference, in actual
practice it depends even more on whether there are any assets left.
The ranking of the preference and its extent can be determined by
the law, but no rule of law can determine in advance what assets-if
any-will be available. In short, while wage protection in the event of
employer insolvency comes within the scope of private law, there is no
possibility that private law can offer any guarantee of payment. This
explains why the prevailing view is that the only adequate way to pro-
tect wages is to remove protection from the realm of private law and to
bring it within the scope of social legislation. 112
Further, recouping monies through winding up is a lengthy process and
employees may not have substantial cash reserves, although they have
pressing debts. 13
For these reasons, the Australian Government has established a further
safety net scheme to protect the rights of workers when their employer
becomes insolvent, the General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy
Scheme (GEERS).'1 4 This scheme provides employees' 15 with a safety
net of entitlements, which includes all (1) unpaid wages, (2) accrued an-
nual leave, (3) accrued pay in lieu of notice, (4) long service leave, and (5)
up to eight weeks of redundancy entitlements (acknowledging the com-
munity standard)." 6 These payments are made up to the salary level of
$75,200 (indexed annually) so long as the employees have a legal entitle-
ment to those amounts derived from legislation, an award, a statutory
agreement, or a written contract of employment.' 17
Policy initiatives such as GEERS were initially introduced to address
problems in the mining and energy sector. As the once commodities-
based Australian economy dealt with the global transition towards tech-
nology, many mines closed, eliminating thousands of jobs in the sector
112. Campo, supra note 102, at 244 (quoting A.S. Bronstein, The Protection of Workers'
Claims in the Event of the Insolvency of Their Employer: From Civil Law to Social Security,
126 INr'L LAB. R. 715, 723 (1987) (emphasis added)).
113. Campo, supra note 102, at 244.
114. This scheme applies to those who lose their jobs after September 12, 2001. For
people who lost their jobs prior to this date, there was a scheme called the Employee
Entitlements Support Scheme (EESS). For Ansett employees, there is a special fund
called Special Employee Entitlements Scheme for Ansett group employees.
115. Note that the scheme excludes independent contractors, shareholding directors,
relatives of shareholding directors, relatives of the former employer, and, in most cases,
those who resigned-unless resignation was due to the employer's non-payment of wages.
See General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme Operational Arrangements§ 5.1 [hereinafter GEERS Operational Arrangements], at http://www.workplace.gov.au/
Workplace/WPDisplay/0,1280,a3 %253D3679%2526a0%253D0%2526a1 %253D517%2526
a2%253D623,00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
116. Id. § 6.1.
117. Id. When the salary is higher than that amount, the employee will still be able to
receive benefits up to that amount.
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and seeing many adjoining mining towns virtually close down. 1 8 Now
the system applies, subject to the above rules, throughout the Australian
workforce. For that reason, the One.Tel workers may have had access to
GEERS had the Commission action failed. However, the important
point to note is that the union chose the Commission route so that the
company responsible for the employees' losses (not the Australian tax-
payer, who funds GEERS) would pay the employees' entitlements, and
do so immediately.
GEERS also makes provision for avoiding the socialisation of loss and
privatisation of gain. It does not relieve employers of their responsibility
to meet employee entitlements, nor does it allow employees to "double
dip."' 1 9 Under section 560 of the Corporations Act of 2001, once the
Government pays monies to the employees, it can seek reimbursement of
payments from the insolvency practitioner as funds become realised from
the sale of assets or from other proceedings. 20 Similarly, if an employee
who is owed seven weeks' redundancy pay has been paid two weeks' re-
dundancy pay through the insolvency process, then the GEERS payment
would cover only five weeks.' 2 ' The point of this approach is that
GEERS payments are made without any legal obligation on the part of





Unlike the ongoing proceedings in the aftermath of Enron's collapse,
where the crux of the problem is retirement benefits and the alleged un-
fair inducement of employees to invest in the company, no such allega-
tions were ever made in One. Tel. Still, it is worth noting the basic
features of the Australian retirement benefits system and asking whether
an Enron-like problem could ever develop in Australia.
The Australian retirement benefits system is referred to as superannua-
tion. Essentially, all superannuation funds (defined benefit and defined
contribution) are separate from the employer, and the funds are gov-
erned by two specialist statutes.
First, the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act of 1992
(SGA Act) mandates that all employers (both public and private) must
pay into a complying superannuation fund an amount equal to a set per-
118. Louise W. Floyd, The Second Wave of Industrial Law Reform (Federal and State):
What You Need to Know, Address at The University of Queensland T.C. Beirne School of
Law CLE Programme at Customs House, Brisbane (Oct. 15, 1999) (on file with SMU Law
Review).
119. See GEERS Operational Arrangements, supra note 115, § 6.5.
120. Corporations Act, 2001, § 560 (Austl.). The government has the rights against the
former employer that the employee would have had.
121. GEERS Operational Arrangements, supra note 115, § 6.5.
122. Id.
123. The author expresses her gratitude to Mr. Peter Skinner, Deputy CEO,
COMSUPER, Australian Government, for discussing with her the various aspects of
Australian superannuation law.
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centage of their employees' salaries (presently 9%).124 (Employees will
normally match employer contributions with funds taken directly out of
their salary. Both amounts are locked away in the fund until the em-
ployee reaches the minimum retirement age of fifty-five.) There are
some exceptions to the superannuation requirement. For example, no su-
perannuation has to be paid for employees earning less than $450 gross
per calendar month, a worker under eighteen who works less than thirty
hours per week, or those over seventy. 125 However, the scheme reaches
about 90% of the Australian workforce (even independent contrac-
tors), 26 and employers failing to meet their responsibility to pay superan-
nuation are liable to pay the superannuation guarantee charge (i.e., the
amount owing, plus interest and the administration fee).127
In conjunction with the SGA Act is the Superannuation Industry (Su-
pervision) Act of 1993 (SIS Act), 128 which regulates the operation of the
superannuation funds and the trustees who run them, and establishes
graduated penalties. The SIS Act also prescribes minimum communica-
tion obligations and members' rights. In essence, it is a form of pruden-
tial regulation, which has minimum processes and controls to ensure that
the risk of members losing their money is minimised.
The specific question of whether an Enron-like problem could develop
in Australia was raised by Australian financial adviser, Daryl Dixon. In
his article, Boss of the Loss, Dixon suggested Enron-style losses could not
readily occur in Australia due to the limits Australian laws place on funds
investing in the actual employer's stock.129 He wrote:
This is a timely lesson for Australian employees about the dangers of
giving employers control over their retirement savings. Fortunately,
where employers do not grant employees the freedom to choose
their superannuation fund, federal government legislation limits the
extent of super fund investment in the company sponsoring the fund.
Under in-house asset rules applying since 1999, employer-spon-
sored funds cannot invest more than 5% of the current market value
of assets in the employer's shares or debt instruments. This is in
sharp contrast to the arrangements in the U.S., where the bulk of
fund assets can be invested in the employer. 130
Although the Dixon article focuses its discussion on defined benefit
plans-as opposed to the Enron 401(k) plan, which was a defined contri-
bution plan-it is suggested that Dixon is correct about an Enron-like
situation not being likely in Australia. The in-house asset rules found in
124. Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act, 1992, § 20 (Austl.).
125. Id. § 12.
126. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the reason 10% is not covered, even though the
system is compulsory, is because some workers will give false tax records, and at other
times smaller employers may go broke before superannuation contributions are banked,
etc.
127. Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act, 1992, § 16 et seq. (Austl.).
128. Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, 1993 (Austl.).
129. Daryl Dixon, Boss of the Loss, THE BULLETIN, Feb. 12, 2002, at 51.
130. Id.
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Part Eight of the SIS Act would seem to prevent such a loss. For exam-
ple, section 83(2) provides that "[i]f the market value ratio of the fund's
in-house assets exceeds 5%, the trustee of the fund must not acquire an
in-house asset." 13' Section 71 defines "in-house asset" as:
an asset ... that is a loan to, or an investment in, a related party of
the fund, an investment in a related trust of the fund, or an asset of
the fund subject to a lease or lease arrangement between the trustee
of the fund and a related party of the fund.' 32
Furthermore, section 10 defines a "related party of a superannuation
fund" as to include "a standard employer-sponsor of the fund. '133
Of course, the Australian system is not totally risk-free. It is prudential
regulation and trustees of funds are not instructed exactly how to invest.
If, for example, a trustee invested largely in property and a property
downturn occurred, a loss would take place. Likewise, an unforeseen,
catastrophic event, could reduce investment values. But, in terms of an
Enron-like problem arising, the rules against conflicts (i.e., the in-house
asset rules) would tend to suggest Australian workers are guarded.
III. LAW REFORM
A. U.S. LAW REFORM: THE CURRENT DEBATE
Efforts to reform U.S. pension law have been underway ever since the
Enron debacle came to light at the end of 2001. The early stages of this
reform process-congressional hearings and the development of an as-
sortment of competing bills-were outlined by Marisa Rogoway in her
recent comment, Proposed Reforms to the Regulation of 401(k) Plans in
the Wake of the Enron Disaster.134
It is the purpose of the present article to follow on from that discussion
and make a contribution to the ongoing law reform process.
The November 2002 elections saw the Republicans regain control of
the Senate (from the Democrats), hence gaining the majority in both
Houses of Congress. For that reason, it is likely that, of the two bills
under consideration before the election, the Republican House Bill
(3762), rather than the Democrat-sponsored Senate Bill (1992) will figure
prominently in any new retirement benefits law passed in 2003. Nonethe-
less, both bills are outlined in this commentary as an appraisal of the old
Senate Bill enhances a critique of the Republican House Bill.
There are two main bills before Congress, 135 including the (1) Pension
131. Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, 1993, § 83(2) (Austl.). For all funds,
see sections 76-80 and, for defined benefit plans, section 83D.
132. Id. § 71(1).
133. Id. § 10.
134. Rogoway, supra note 85, at 427.
135. These bills deal with such Enron-related issues as over-investment in employer
stock and the provision of advice for 401(k) plan participants. In addition, there is further
legislation providing for a creditor's committee of employees formed for the protection of
pensions. See, e.g., Employee Pension Bankruptcy Protection Act of 2002, S. 3028, 107th
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Security Act of 2002 (House Bill 3762),136 which passed the House of
Representatives on April 11, 2002, containing many of the provisions of
an earlier Republican version introduced by Representative Boehner;137
and (2) the Protecting America's Pensions Act of 2002 (Senate Bill
1992),138 the Senate legislation dealing with retirement benefit issues. The
bills differ not only in the way they facilitate the giving of advice to plan
beneficiaries and the manner in which that advice is given, but also in the
way they deal with the diversification of plan assets, particularly limits on
investment in employer stock. Issues such as notification of lockdown
periods and bars on insider trading during lockdowns have also been ad-
dressed in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.139
On the question of advice, House Bill 3762 allows the plan fiduciary to
earn fees and compensation from the giving of advice so long as the fees
are revealed to plan participants at a time reasonably contemporaneous
to the giving of that advice. 140 Senate Bill 1992 bars the giving of advice
by plan fiduciaries.' 4 '
As to diversification and employer stock, House Bill 3762 allows em-
ployees to divest themselves of employer stock, but only after a three-
year threshold period has elapsed for each parcel of employer stock given
to the employee by the employer. 42 In terms of over-concentration in
employer stock, House Bill 3762 provides for the giving of general educa-
tional material to investors that discusses the risk of holding more than
25% of a portfolio in any one stock, including stock issued by the em-
ployer. 143 In contrast, Senate Bill 1992 provides for specific warnings to
be included in account statements if an investment in employer stock ex-
ceeds 20%. 144 The waiting period for the selling of employer stock is a
one-off, three-year period-it is not a waiting period for each allotment
that the employer gives.' 45
I. Advice
In his analysis of the Senate advice proposal, Representative Boehner
suggests that such legislation will lessen the availability of investment ad-
vice, limiting it to a few providers on the internet. 146 Certainly, the Sen-
Cong. (2002). It is interesting to note that the U.S. debate does not include any plans to
adopt a system like Australia's GEERS.
136. Pension Security Act of 2002, H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. (2002).
137. Retirement Security Act of 2001, H.R. 2269, 107th Cong. (2001).
138. Protecting America's Pensions Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002).
139. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 306, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
140. H.R. 3762 § 105(g)(1).
141. S. 1992 § 103.
142. H.R. 3762 § 104(a).
143. Id. § 101(a)(2).
144. S. 1992 § 201.
145. Id. § 101.
146. U.S. REP. JOHN BOEHNER, WIDENING THE RETIREMENT SECURITY ADVICE GAl':
WHY THE SENATE DEMOCRAT PENSION REFORM BILL IS Too WEAK TO PROTECT U.S.
WORKERS 8 (2002). The Congressman actually refers to Senate Bill 1.677 in this document.
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ate proposal does centre on internet advice, but it is conducted by email,
so there is some tailoring of advice-it is not simply a series of fact sheets.
As noted by authors like Stabile, there may, in fact, be a problem with
House Bill 3762; namely, the potential for conflicted advice. 147
In the view of this author, House Bill 3762 seems to rely on full and
honest disclosure by advisers, and, perhaps, on the effectiveness of so-
called "Chinese Walls" to ensure that those who give advice within a firm
are not covertly profiting from a trade. One can only hope those walls
are thick. Enron was rife with alleged conflicts of interests, which can be
difficult to detect, even for Wall Street and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. 48 Looking at the alternative Senate proposal, it may limit
the advisers available, but one may well wonder whether, in a country the
size of the United States, one could ever completely debar every good
investment advisor simply through high standards on conflicts of interest.
2. Diversification
As to diversification from employer stock, education is a wonderful
tool and freedom is often noble, but one may question why House Bill
3762 favours the mere sending of educational material to employee-inves-
tors as opposed to the provision of specific warnings in account state-
ments if investment in their employer is too high.
As noted above, the Enron scandal involved many previously-revered
accounting firms, such as Arthur Andersen, and fooled many well-edu-
cated, well-connected Wall Street analysts. The workers who contribute
to these funds often have neither, and are busy holding together some
semblance of family life, while paying the bills and working. 149 In testify-
ing before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pen-
sions, Alicia Munnell of the Carroll School of Management, Boston
College, asked why workers should not be able to invest safely without
having to understand the complexities of maintaining a diverse account
Senate Bill 1677 is in similar terms to Senate Bill 1992, which became the key Democrat-
sponsored Senate Bill. See also HOUSE EDUCATION & THE WORKFORCE COMMI-FrEE,
FACTr SHEET ON H.R. 2269-RETIREMENT SECURITY ADVICE AcT at http://edworkforce.
house.gov/issues/107th/workforce/erisa/onepagefs.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003); HousE
EDUCATION & THE WORKFORCE COMMII'EE, BILL SUMMARY OF H.R. 2269-REl IRE-
MENT SECURrrY ADVICE ACT at http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/107th/workforce/er-
isa/summary.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
147. See Stabile, supra note 85, at 383-85.
148. These alleged conflicts have been detailed in the earlier pages of this article. See
supra Part II.A.I. Further, there were concerns as to whether investment advisers who
relied on so-called "Chinese Walls" in their firms had breached standards and committed
conflicts of interest. See Tittle Complaint, supra note 43, paras. 603, 634-635. News reports
have revealed that some analysts question why the SEC did not raise questions about En-
ron's accounting at an earlier time. See, e.g., NBC Nightly News (NBC television broad-
cast, Oct. 7, 2002).
149. Rogoway, supra note 85, at 430 (citing Pension and Retirement Issues in Enron
Collapse: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health,, Education, Labor and Pensions.
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Alicia H. Munnell, Professor, Boston College Carroll
School of Management)).
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portfolio.' 511 Why did they have to become investment experts instead of
being able to "coach their kid's soccer team, play tennis or read a
book"?' 5 ' Likewise, Stabile has warned of the problems associated with
over-investment by employees in their employer and whether employees
ever really control 401(k) plans. 52
In the view of this author, it is baffling why there cannot be direct
warnings to employees. Such warnings do not mandate the selling of em-
ployer stock. Even if they did, it may not be a bad thing. While some
employers clearly are a tremendous investment (e.g., Wal-Mart), is it ever
the case that there is only one good stock on the market at any given
time? Further, supervening external events can damage even the most
honest and well-run business.
As alluded to in the opening portions of this article, the only other
reform to follow in the wake of the Enron scandal is corporate law re-
form. 53 The Secretary of Labor, Elaine Chow, noted that such reform
could be viewed as a type of labour reform as it could deter the type of
corporate misconduct that may threaten jobs and employee entitlements
in the future.' 54 Clearly, corporate law reform is necessary and desirable,
but there are always difficulties with the prosecution of white collar
crime-proving offences, finding assets that have been hidden. 155 For
that reason, this author urges a robust approach to positively regulating
for employee protection.
B. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM
Australia's treatment of employee entitlements is under review by the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services.
While the Committee's deliberations are ongoing, suggestions as to re-
form have been put forward in the wake of the One.Tel collapse.
Possible reforms include enhancing directors' duties so that employees
become part of the interests of the company and, therefore, a group
whose interests the directors must consider in the making of decisions. 56
150. Pension and Retirement Issues in Enron Collapse: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Alicia
H. Munnell, Professor, Boston College Carroll School of Management).
151. Id. Professor Munnell actually proposed providing workers with a limited array of
investment options with varying degrees of risk and making the Department of Labor re-
sponsible for deeming the option to be prudent. That would also protect employers be-
cause the plans would be pre-approved.
152. See Stabile, supra note 87; Stabile, supra note 85, at 382 (arguing for thorough
pension reform and relying on a consideration of jurisprudential theories, human behav-
ioral studies, and domestic considerations to advance her case).
153. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
154. Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 2, 2002).
155. White collar crime laws have sometimes been referred to as possible "paper
tigers." See Campo, supra note 102, at 245 (noting the difficulty of proving an employer's
intent to do wrong under Australia's Corporations Act of 2002).
156. Tom Bostock, To Whom Are the Duties of a Company Director Owed?, Address
at the Australian Institute of Company Directors and Centre for Corporate Law and Se-
curities Regulation Conference I (Nov. 8, 2000) (on file with SMU Law Review) (discuss-
ing Prof. Robert Baxt, Do Directors Owe a Duty to Employees?, Address at the Law
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(In a similar vein, some trade unions are already taking action to acquire
employer stock and, therefore, have a voice at corporate meetings.) 5 7
Some have suggested the creation of a so-called "super preference,"
which would give employees preference over even secured creditors in a
winding up. Those that support such a preference argue that it would not
discourage investment in Australia. They suggest that if the only thing
preventing investment was a fear by secured creditors that they would
lose money on employee entitlements, then the investment was so uncer-
tain that no sound investor would have made it in the first place.' 58 De-
spite those sentiments, it is this author's view that a super preference is
not commercially viable and would jeopardise investment in developing
Australian businesses. It is a small country in a competitive world and
investment is its future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Paul Barry ended his commentary of the One.Tel collapse by noting
the behaviour of its directors in concealing corporate losses made while
they were receiving millions in bonuses. He lamented that "[t]o many, it
seemed like the 1980s were back, and greed was good all over again."'1 59
This echoes the words of the mythical Gordon Gekko in the 1980s movie,
Wall Street, in which the magnate suggested to stock holders that "Greed
... is good. Greed is right. Greed works."' 60
From a law reform perspective, it may well be that the words at the end
of that movie were even more compelling. Gekko's prot6g6, Bud Fox,
had distanced himself from his working class background to "insider
trade" his way to the top. After he was caught and faced jail, Fox's
unionist father expressed to his son: "In some kind of screwed up way, it's
the best thing that could have happened to you. Stop going for the easy
buck and start producing something with your life. Create, instead of
living off the buying and selling of others."' 16' Surely it is the creation of
things to foster a better life that resonates with the American dream. Yet,
as recent events demonstrate, it is sometimes the very people pursuing
that dream who are exploited. Such exploitation is, sadly, a global
phenomenon.
Council of Australia's Annual Corporate Law Workshop (July 2000)). Bostock takes the
view that the law has not yet reached this stage, but is changing fast.
157. John Maitland, Shareholders and the Non-Financial Agenda, Address at The Polit-
ics of Shareholder Activism: A Centre for Corporate Public Affairs Conference, available
at http://www.cfmeu.asn.au/national/int-issues/20011203_Activism.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2003). To a degree, this type of approach may be developing within the American labour
movement as well. See UNIONS @ WORK: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CREATING A
Just and Fair Society, Australian Council of Trade Unions Overseas Delegation (1999).
158. This idea was discussed in Craig Cameron, Paper on Employee Entitlement Pro-
tection-A Multi-faceted Approach (Dec. 2001) (unpublished manuscript presented at the
Australian Labour Lawyers Conference, Dec. 2001).
159. BARRY, supra note 91, at 212.
160. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
161. Id.
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The purpose of this article is to offer some contribution to the current
U.S. law reform debate in the hope that a robust stance is adopted to-
wards the protection of the rights and entitlements of working people. 162
As noted throughout, such a stance has been adopted in Australia.
Strong protection also exists for employees in the European Union,
Great Britain, and Canada. 63 While the U.S. inclination in labour law is
to emphasise private contract and individual freedom; there is ample jus-
tification for government intervention on this question. The "victims" of
corporate insolvency are often blameless and least able to absorb a loss.
In contrast, those who cause insolvency may be plausible enough that
business dynasties, like the Murdochs, lose millions and emerge not "the
brightest crayons in the box."' 164 It may well be that this is a new sort of
"crime," and the question should not be whether robust regulation is an-
tithetical to U.S. legal tradition, but whether recent, alleged, white collar
crime is consistent with free enterprise or something more sinister.
162. As alluded to, it is submitted that there should be greater regulation of U.S. pen-
sion law in order to provide stronger guidance to 401(k) plan participants. The author
accepts that intervention of the type arising in the One.Tel application is probably outside
the scope of the U.S. system. However, the author argues that payments similar to those
made under GEERS should at least be considered by the U.S. Government in cases such
as Enron.
163. Campo, supra note 102, at 247.
164. BARRY, supra note 91, at 329.
1004 [Vol. 56
